Abstract-Tampering of a database can be detected through the use of cryptographically strong hash functions. Subsequently, applied forensic analysis algorithms can help determine when, what, and perhaps ultimately who and why. This paper presents a novel forensic analysis algorithm, the Tiled Bitmap Algorithm, which is more efficient than prior forensic analysis algorithms. It introduces the notion of a candidate set (all possible locations of detected tampering(s)) and provides a complete characterization of the candidate set and its cardinality. An optimal algorithm for computing the candidate set is also presented. Finally, the implementation of the Tiled Bitmap Algorithm is discussed, along with a comparison to other forensic algorithms in terms of space/time complexity and cost. An example of candidate set generation and proofs of the theorems and lemmata and of algorithm correctness can be found in the appendix, which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library at http://doi.ieeecomputersociety
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MOTIVATION
W IDESPREAD news coverage of collusion between auditors and the companies they audit (e.g., Enron and WorldCom) helped accelerate recent passage of federal laws (e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act: HIPAA [12] , Sarbanes-Oxley Act [13] ) that mandate better controls on electronic data. Compliant records are those required by myriad laws and regulations to follow certain "processes by which they are created, stored, accessed, maintained, and retained" [2] .
We previously proposed an innovative approach in which cryptographically strong one-way hash functions allow the detection of a corruption event (CE), which is any event that corrupts the data and compromises the database. The corruption event could be due to an adversary, including an auditor or an employee or even an unknown bug in the software (be it the DBMS or the file system or somewhere in the operating system), or a hardware failure, either in the processor or on the disk [10] . Tamper detection is accomplished by hashing data manipulated by transactions and periodically validating the audit log database to detect when it has been altered. Validation involves sending the hash value computed over all the database to an external notarization service, which will indicate whether that value matches one previously computed. Should tampering have occurred, the two hash values will not match.
At this point, all that is known is that at some time in the past, data somewhere in the database have been tampered. Forensic analysis is needed to ascertain when the tampering occurred, and what data were altered. Knowing the "when" and "what" can give indirect clues to the CIO and CSO that would perhaps allow them to ultimately determine who the adversary is and why the corruption was done. The identification of the adversary is not explicitly dealt with.
Validation provides a single bit of information: has the database been tampered with? To provide more information about when and what, we hash the data of various sequences of transactions during validation. The database transactions are hashed in commit order creating a hash chain. Then, during forensic analysis of a subsequent validation that detected tampering, those chains can be rehashed to provide a sequence of truth values (success or failure), which can be used to narrow down "what. " We have elsewhere [7] proposed the Monochromatic, RGB, and Polychromatic forensic analysis algorithms. These algorithms differ in the amount of work necessary during normal processing (computing additional hash chains during periodic validation) and the precision of the when and what estimates produced by forensic analysis. Here, we introduce a more efficient algorithm, the Tiled Bitmap Algorithm.
We first present the threat model, then the Tiled Bitmap Algorithm by way of an example. This algorithm requires what we term as the candidate set. We then consider the more general problem of characterizing the candidate set, which can be utilized to produce two approaches for computing that set. This is followed by an evaluation of the implemented algorithm. We end with a discussion of previous work and a summary. access, at which point he has access to everything: the DBMS, the operating system, the hardware, and the data in the database. We still assume that the notarization and validation services remain in a trusted computing base. This can be done by making them geographically and perhaps organizationally separate from the DBMS and the database [5] , thereby effecting correct tamper detection even when the tampering is done by highly motivated insiders. (A recent FBI study indicates that almost half of attacks were by insiders [1] .) To prevent spoofing between the DBMS and the validator, it is possible to use a combination of Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs), mutual authentication, and a secure communication channel. The specifics of this scheme are beyond the scope of this paper.
The basic mechanism described in the next section provides correct tamper detection. If an adversary modifies even a single byte of the data or its time stamp, the independent validator will detect a mismatch with the notarized document, thereby detecting the tampering. The adversary could simply reexecute the transactions, making whatever changes he wanted, and then replace the original database with his altered one. However, the notarized documents would not match in time. Avoiding tamper detection comes down to inverting the cryptographically strong one-way hash function. An extensive presentation of the approach, performance limitations, tamper detection, threat model, and other forensic analysis algorithms can be found elsewhere [8] , [10] .
AN EXAMPLE
Consider a database recording when privacy release authorizations were signed by a patient (in the US, all patients are now required by HIPAA [12] to sign such authorizations). For ease of discussion, we'll use a granularity of an hour. Dr. Dan inadvertently revealed confidential health information to an insurance company on hour 30, shortly before patient Pam actually signed the authorization (on hour 31). Dr. Dan later realized his mistake, which is an offense under HIPAA and can have significant legal implications. So, on hour 51, Dr. Dan colludes with his friend the database administrator to alter the database to backdate that authorization from hour 31 to hour 28. The database now implies that authorization had been received on hour 28, just before the confidential information was transferred on hour 30: everything looks fine.
In order to ensure HIPAA compliance, the health care company that Dr. Dan works for uses a database management system incorporating tamper detection and forensic analysis. Each transaction is hashed when it is committed and linked to the previous transaction. Every 16 hours the system runs the validator, which rehashes all the transactions and compares the value with the previously notarized and stored hash value. The time interval between two successive validations is termed the validation interval, or I V (see Table 1 ). The validator also computes partial chains that will later be useful in forensic analysis. Specifically, it computes the five hash chains shown in Fig. 1 , hash chain c 0 through hash chain c 4 , over the previous 16 hours, storing five hash values in a secure database available only to an external digital notarization service. Each 16-hour collection of partial hash chains is termed a tile.
When the validator runs at hour 64, it detects the tampering. The forensic analysis algorithm springs into action. It first reports to the compliance service that the database was tampered sometime within the last 16 hours, between hour 49 and hour 64. That helps bound the "when" of the tampering. The algorithm then recomputes some of the partial hash chains on the tampered data and sends the new hash values to the notarization service, which responds with "success" (the old and new values match) or "failure," for each hash chain queried.
Specifically, the algorithm linearly scans all the tiles in the database to identify in which tile(s) the tampering occurred. The "success" and "failure" response of the c 0 chain of each tile will, in this case, narrow down the tampering to the tile covering hours 17-32. Note that each tile that includes a tampering can be independently analyzed, and a corruption across tiles, say changing a time stamp from hour 31 (in the second tile) to hour 7 (in the first tile) can be analyzed by examining each tile independently. In Dr. Dan's case, the validation of the c 0 chain will report a "failure," for only the 17-32 tile. This tells the algorithm that the "what" of the tampering was data stored between hours 17 and 32, a 16-hour period. However, we would like to narrow down the tampering to a much finer granularity: that of a single hour, or at least down to a few hours. (It turns out that depending on when the corruption occurred, sometimes we can do very well and sometimes less well.)
In Fig. 1 , Dr. Dan's backdating of the authorization from hour 31 to hour 28 is shown at the top, as a left-pointing arrow. The first hash chain, c 0 , is also shown at the top.
The algorithm now recomputes the other four partial hash chains for this tile, c 1 -c 4 . Four partial hash chains are used to get down to an hour granularity, given that each tile is 16 hours, which is the validation interval I V .
The finest spatial granularity of the corrupted data would be an explicit attribute of a tuple or a particular time stamp attribute. However, this proves to be costly and hence we define R s , the finest granularity chosen to express the uncertainty of the spatial bounds of a corruption event. R s is called the spatial detection resolution.
The database administrator specifies both I V and R s , in this case, 16 hours and 1 hour, respectively. An R s of 1 hour implies four other chains, excluding c 0 , are needed in a tile (since lgðI V Þ ¼ log 2 ð16Þ ¼ 4). If we wanted a finer granularity of, say, 15 minutes (1=4 hour), we would need an additional two chains (i.e., lgð16 Ä Hash chain c 1 covers the first eight hours of the tile. Hash chain c 2 covers the first four hours, then skips four hours, then covers hours 8-11. Similarly, c 3 covers four two-hour periods, with embedded skips, and c 4 covers every other hour. (Hash chain linking is discussed in more detail elsewhere [10] .)
Changing the time stamp on an authorization is equivalent to removing that authorization from all hash chains that cover the original time and adding that authorization to all hash chains that cover the inserted time. Examination of Fig. 1 will explain why hour 28, in which the authorization was added by Dr. Dan, appears in hash chains c 0 and c 2 . Hour 31, from which the authorization was removed by Dr. Dan, appears in hash chains c 0 and c 4 . Hence, c 1 and c 3 report "success" and c 0 , c 2 , and c 4 report "fail."
We can assemble the success and failure results for the four hash chains c 1 -c 4 into a 4-bit binary number, with failure denoted with "0" and success with "1." The number that results from this particular backdating from hour 31 to hour 28 is 1010. We term this value the target binary number or target. The target is the input to the forensic analysis. Our task is to take this binary number, the target, and figure out what could have happened.
The truth values shown at the bottom of the figure indicate the target string that would result had the corruption event tampered with data stored at the indicated hour. For example, changing the data of a tuple that were originally stored in the first hour of this interval would have rendered all of the chains as failure, resulting in a value of 0000.
Recall that our corruption event occurred at hour 51, changing a time stamp from 31 to 28, the hash chains provide a target of 1010. What could such a target indicate? It could indicate the corruption of data during a single hour, or any combination of time stamp and/or data during two or more separate hours such that the resulting target after validation is equal to 1010. For example, one possibility is that only the data in hour 27 (r ¼ 10) was modified. Another is that the time stamp was moved from 31 (r ¼ 14 ¼ 1110 2 ) to 28 (r ¼ 11 ¼ 1011 2 ), again yielding a target 1010. This is in fact what happened. A different possibility is that the data in hours 28 and 31 were corrupted independently. A fourth possibility is that the time was moved from 28 to 31. Other possibilities are a change from hour 27 to hour 31, a change from hour 27 to hour 32, a change from hour 27 to hour 28, or a change in the other direction. All these possibilities and many others result in a target of 1010. Precisely because this list of possibilities can get quite long, we introduce in the next section the notion of candidate set which retains comprehensiveness but is a lot simpler.
There are two special cases worth discussing separately. If target bit pattern is 1111 then it is not the case that no corruption has happened. To begin with, we are certain that there is corruption in this tile because c 0 reported "failure." The only thing that pattern 1111 implies is that no corruption has occurred in the time granules covered by hash chains c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , and c 4 . The only granule not covered by these last four hash chains is the last granule (15) so we can conclude (by eliminating all other possibilities) that the corruption must have been located in time granule 15. This is the only case where we are certain that there are no false positives.
On the other hand, if the target bit pattern is 0000 then a corruption event can be anywhere in the tile's 16 time granules. Even though this does not affect correctness, this is the worst case scenario where we could potentially have the maximum number of false positives.
THE TILED BITMAP ALGORITHM
We formally define the problem as follows: Problem Definition: The task is to compute from a single target all the possible corruption events, which we term the candidate set.
For the example in the previous section, the candidate set would comprise the hours f27; 28; 31; 32g. We now present an algorithm to do this.
In the algorithm shown in Fig. 2 , I V is the number of hours between validations (in the example, I V ¼ 16). We use a helper function called val_check. This function takes a hash chain as a parameter and returns the boolean result of the validation of that chain.
The partial hash chains within a tile are denoted by c 0 ðÞ; c 1 ðÞ; . . . ; c lg ðIV Þ ðÞ, with c i ðÞ denoting the ith hash chain of the tile which starts at time instant . On line 4, the algorithm iterates through the different tiles and checks if the longest partial chain c 0 ðÞ evaluates to FALSE. If not, it moves on to the next tile. If the chain evaluates to FALSE (line 5), the algorithm iterates through the rest of the partial chains in the tile (line 7) and "concatenates" the result of each validation to form the target number (line 8). Then, the candidateSet function is called (line 9) to compute all the candidate set elements from the target number according to the user-specified parameter k discussed in the next section. On lines 10-12, the candidate granules are renumbered to reflect their global position. The function renumber( ) on line 11 uses R s to find the global position of r, computing g as a single granule, or group of granules if R s > 1. Once the C set is reported, the CSO can exactly pinpoint the corrupted tuples and can thus weed out the false positives. In order to achieve this, he must compare the data stored in the backup tapes with the data contained in the granules.
We now state the running time of the Tiled Bitmap Algorithm. Let D be the number of granules (hours) before the first validation failure (for the example, D ¼ 64). The "while" loop on line 4 takes dD=I V e in the worst case. In reality, because of the "if" statement on line 5 the body of the loop gets executed only if corruption is initially detected by using c 0 ðÞ. Hence, the actual number of times the loop is executed is ÂðF Þ where F is the number of times the validation of a c 0 ðÞ chain fails. The "for" loop on line 7 takes lgðI V =R s Þ while the candidateSet function takes ðlgðI V =R s Þ þ 2 zðtÞ Þ, where zðtÞ is the number of zeros in the target binary number t (see Section 5) . The loop on line 10 takes Âð2 zðtÞ Þ. Hence, the runtime of this algorithm is
given that in the worst case F takes the value ðD=I V Þ, which is the total number of tiles, and 2 zðtÞ takes the value I V , which the total number of granules in a tile.
There is one important aspect left unaddressed in the above algorithm: the candidateSet function. But before we can present this latter algorithm, we must formally characterize the candidate set.
CHARACTERIZING THE CANDIDATE SET
In the forensic analysis context, the parameter k passed to the algorithm represents the actual number of granules corrupted. In the example shown in Fig. 1 , k ¼ 2. However, we usually have no knowledge of the value of k. What we have is only the target from which we have to find the possible bit patterns (each generated by the validation of the chains in the tile assuming that corruption occurred by itself) that when bitwise ANDed produce the target. The reason for requiring that the different bit patterns produce the target when ANDed is because this is effectively what happens when the corruptions occur simultaneously within a tile. This arises from the mechanics of forensic analysis. Specifically, each corruption event renders some of the chains as "failing." A chain will succeed in the end only if it succeeds in every one of the corruption events. So, in the example, chains c 1 and c 3 succeed, but chains c 2 and c 4 fail. The set of all such bit patterns which could produce the target when ANDed is termed the candidate set. In order to be more rigorous in our analysis, we proceed to give a formal characterization of the candidate set.
We define the length l of a binary number b, denoted by jbj ¼ l, as the number of its digits. From this point forward we consider l to be fixed. candidateSet essentially "sums up" the preimages of all the binary numbers of length l, IB ¼ fb : jbj ¼ lg, under a family of bitwise AND functions whose domain is a finite Cartesian product.
Observe that the maximum number k of sets participating in the Cartesian product is 2 l (i.e., every granule in the tile is corrupted), since if k is allowed to take a value beyond that, it will force a repetition of one of the binary numbers. For forensic analysis purposes this implies that the same granule has been corrupted more than once. This is not informative or useful in any way since repeated ANDing operations with the same binary number leave the result invariant (the operation is idempotent). This is also compatible with forensic analysis since we only care if a granule is corrupted or not-if we wanted to know more we would need to increase the resolution by choosing a smaller granule size (i.e., smaller R s ). In other words, repetition is not allowed and hence for a given k-tuple all its components are distinct. Also note that the value of k uniquely identifies a specific AND k function in the above family.
We formally define the set of all binary numbers which appear as components in at least one of the preimages (i.e., k-tuples) of a specific target binary number t the candidate set:
AND k ððb; b 1 ; . . . ; b kÀ1 ÞÞ ¼ tg:
The^operation is commutative: the order of the operands does not matter, and that is why this can be defined more simply as a set of booleans rather than as a set of k-tuples of booleans. The word "candidate" was used to name this set because in forensic analysis, its elements correspond bijectively to the granules (in the example, the hours indicated in Fig. 1 ), which are candidates where corruption may potentially have occurred. In Dr. Dan's case, the candidate set would be the hours 27, 28, 31, and 32 that is, r ¼ 10, r ¼ 11, r ¼ 14, and r ¼ 15. Observe that, it is not the case that jC t;k j ¼ k, i.e., k is not the cardinality of the candidate set. The cardinality in the example is 4: in this case, the algorithm can narrow down the possibilities only to four granules, two actual ones (k ¼ 2) and two false positives. The candidate set will comprise all possible binary numbers that could produce the target bit pattern, and not just the granules corrupted in a specific case. Hence, the candidate set will always include the actual k granules that were corrupted together with other potentially corrupted granules. This ensures correctness but allows for the existence of false positives.
For convenience, we can express these sets in decimal, though our algorithms read and write in binary. For example: C 1010;1 ¼ f1010g ¼ f10g, C 1010;2 ¼ f1010; 1011; 1110; 1111g ¼ f10; 11; 14; 15g. 1001 is not in C 1010;2 because 1001 cannot be in the preimage of 1010. Note that even though two binary target strings may have the same numerical value, if their length is different, then their candidate sets will be different. For example, the candidate set C 000;2 is different from C 0000;2 .
Let zðtÞ be the number of zeros in the binary number t, e.g., zð1010Þ ¼ 2. By definition 1 k 2 l and 0 z l. The behavior of C t;k is interesting: as k increases the candidate set for a fixed t remains invariant and equal to the candidate set for k ¼ 2, until some threshold value 2 zðtÞ after which it becomes empty. Simply put, C t;k obeys an all-or-none law.
Lemma 1. C t;k ¼ C t;2 if l ! zðtÞ > 0 and 2 k 2 zðtÞ . In other words, the candidate set remains invariant given that the stated conditions are met. Theorem 1 is the reason for which we decided to make k user-configurable in the Tiled Bitmap pseudocode. If the CSO by some other means has any indication for the value of k, i.e., the actual number of corruptions occurred, then he can pass that information to the algorithm. If the algorithm returns an empty candidate set then the CSO can deduce that his initial knowledge/guess for the value of k was incorrect. If the CSO has no a priori knowledge about the value of k, as is usually the case, then according to Theorem 1 the CSO need only give k the default value of 2 and not worry that any other choice for k would compromise the forensic analysis results. zðtÞ ¼ 0^k > 1; 2 zðtÞ ; l ! zðtÞ > 0^2 k 2 zðtÞ ; 0; l! zðtÞ > 0^k > 2 zðtÞ :
Proof. Given in Appendix
Proof. This follows directly from Theorem 1. t u
For example, with our target bit pattern of t ¼ 1010, we have zðtÞ ¼ 2 and the candidate set is C 1010;2 ¼ f10; 11; 14; 15g with jC 1010;2 j ¼ 2 2 ¼ 4. We now turn to ways in which the candidate set may be computed. We first give an algorithm that is optimal in time, except for a very few cases. Following some further observations on candidate sets, we show how, given a candidate set, one can calculate other candidate sets with a smaller l in constant time.
COMPUTING THE CANDIDATE SET
Figs. 3, 4, 5, and 6 present an optimal algorithm for computing the candidate set given the target string t and k, and again assuming a fixed l. Recall that candidateSet is used in the Tiled Bitmap Algorithm. It generates the elements (bit patterns) in the candidate set from the target pattern t preserving bit positions with 1s and creating combinations of patterns of 1s and 0s using the remaining positions having 0s. Let us now briefly examine this algorithm. We first start by looking at the candidateSet function (Fig. 3) and discuss each different function as we encounter it.
The use of the Z array on lines 4 and 7 will be explained later in the discussion following Theorem 2. Lines 8-12 follow the result of Theorem 1. Then, on line 13 the createRightmost helper function is called (Fig. 4) to preprocess the target binary number t and to fill the rightmost array in order to answer the "rightmost zero" query in constant time. More specifically, rightmost½p is the index (bit position) of the rightmost zero to the left of index p noninclusive. Within this function i iterates over t from left to right (high-order to low-order bits). The flag is required because we must remember what we saw in the previous iteration: if flag ¼ TRUE we saw a 0, otherwise we saw a 1. This runs in ÂðlÞ.
On line 14 (Fig. 3) , the generate function (Fig. 5) is called. This is a recursive function which creates the candidate set elements. Given a position p, which is a specific index in the zero-based enumeration (left to right) of the binary number t, it finds the index of the rightmost zero to the left of p using the rightmost array. It first recurses on that index maintaining the same binary number (line 4) and then sets the digit at position p to 1 and recurses on the same index rightmost½p but with this new number (line 5). We can consider the input target string t as capturing all the 2 zðtÞ numbers that must be generated during the recursion, so we can consider the input size to be n ¼ 2 zðtÞ . Also, at each recursive call the position of the zero processed is never revisited so the input size at each call is essentially halved. Moreover, the amount of work done at each stage of the recursion is constant hence the formula that captures this recursion is T ðnÞ ¼ 2T ð n 2 Þ þ Âð1Þ. The solution of this formula is ÂðnÞ so the running time of the generate function is Âð2 zðtÞ Þ. However, a side effect of this recursive creation of the candidate set elements is that the elements are not generated in numeric order.
On line 15 of candidateSet (Fig. 3) , we call the sorting function. Even though the elements are not sorted there does exist a pattern in the order in which they are created. This funkySort function (Fig. 6 ) creates the sequence of indices which when used to index into the C t;k array will result in the ordering of the candidate set elements. This is achieved by performing a single pass over the indices array and creating each new index by manipulating appropriately previous ones (lines [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] within the funkySort function.
For example, with a binary target of t ¼ 10000, i.e., 16 in decimal, after the generate function finishes the candidate set will be C t;k ¼ f16; 24; 20; 28; 18; 26; 22; 30; 17; 25; 21; 29; 19; 27; 23; 31g in this order. Examining closely the set we see that in order to create the sorted array we must recursively visit the first element of each subsequent half 0 to the first eight numbers. This explains why at elements appearing at indices which are powers of 2 in the indices array, the offset is reset to zero and the power is halved. On lines 14-15 (Fig. 6) , we use the sequence of indices we created and the actual sorting happens. This pass over the indices array runs in Âð2 zðtÞ Þ. The running time of candidateSet is Âðl þ 2 zðtÞ Þ. Thus, the algorithm is optimal most of the time, using the lower bound given in Section 5, except for the very few cases when l > 2 zðtÞ . In terms of space complexity, the algorithm given here requires Oðl þ 2 zðtÞ Þ space.
AN OPTIMAL CANDIDATE SET ALGORITHM, GIVEN A SUMMARY SET
We define the summary set as the set of all candidate sets of all binary numbers of length l. S l;k ¼ fC t;k : 8t 2 IB s:t: jtj ¼ lg For l ¼ 4 and k ¼ 2, the last column in Table 2 provides the elements of S 4;2 . We now show that for fixed k and given S l;k one can calculate all S l 0 ;k s.t. l 0 < l without resorting to the algorithm given previously. This allows us to find the candidate set for a suffix of y whenever we already have the candidate set for y. The technique shown below can potentially be faster. We define the candidate array, denoted A t;k , to be an array which contains the elements of C t;k sorted in ascending numerical value. Then, A t;k ½x : y selects all elements in the candidate array from index x to y. (NB: A t;k ½i ¼ A t;k ½i : i.) Also, for reasons of ease and precision, we annotate A with the length of the binary number whose value was previously implicit, as a leading subscript.
Given a candidate array l A y;k for a specific target string y, we wish to compute the candidate array lÀx A t;k where t is a suffix (l ¼ jyj > l À x ¼ jtj ! 1) of y. Each S l;k captures all the candidate sets for all l 0 < l. This method creates each element of S l 0 ;k by exploiting the fact that each of the binary numbers of length l 0 is a suffix of more than one corresponding binary number of length l. For example, the candidate set C 1010;2 can be computed from the candidate sets of 01010, 001010, 101010, and so on. Let y ¼ p t ¼ f0; 1g
x t for some prefix p of length x. Let Suffix i ðsÞ denote the suffix of string s starting at position i.
Let us look at some examples to develop some intuition. Given 4 A 0010;2 ¼ ½0010; 0011; 0110; 0111; 1010; 1011; 1110; 1111, we wish to compute 3 A 010;2 . Observe that t ¼ 010 is y ¼ 0010 with the leftmost "0" removed. Removing the leading "0" from y results in a string t which cannot encode any numbers in the range 2 3 to 2 4 À 1. Thus the candidate array of 3 A 010;2 will have the same elements as the candidate array of 4 A 0110;2 except for the numbers encoded by the extra leading digit. We know that each additional "0" present in the target string doubles the cardinality of the candidate set, thus a removal of the zero will halve the number of candidate set elements. Observe also that the elements in the second half of 4 A 0010;2 have essentially the same bit pattern as the elements in the first half but with a "1" at the leftmost position instead of a "0," e.g., 1110 has the same bit pattern as 0110 apart from the bit in the leftmost position.
Thus, in order to compute 3 A 010;2 we can truncate the leftmost digit from all the elements in the original candidate set. By removing the leftmost digit from each of the elements in 4 A 0010;2 , we get 010, 011, 110, 111, 010, 011, 110, 111. The first half of the elements will have a leading "0" removed, something which will not change their numerical value, while the second half which will have a leading "1" removed will produce identical numbers of length 3 to the truncated numbers in the first half. Since the cardinality of 3 A 010;2 is half that of 4 Let us consider a different example with the original target string being y ¼ 1010 and the same suffix t ¼ 010 as before. In this case 4 A 1010;2 ¼ ½1010; 1011; 1110; 1111 all elements necessarily start with a "1." Since removing the leading "1" from y to get t does not affect the number of zeros in the strings, the cardinalities of the two candidate sets is the same. Removing the leftmost "1" from all the elements of 4 A 1010;2 will yield directly the desired elements of the new candidate set:
With these valuable observations, we can now state the theorem.
Theorem 2. Assume y ¼ p t ¼ f0; 1g
x t, 0 < x < l, 0 zðtÞ l À x and q ¼ 2 zðtÞ . Then: The strategy for computing the candidate sets using this new method is given below. First, we change line 9 of the original Tiled_Bitmap function in Fig. 2 9: C temp candidateSetðtarget; n; kÞ to 9: C temp candidateSetCachedðtarget; n; kÞ
We introduce a list, cache[ ] of records ðy; l y ; k; C y;k ; ZÞ which is updated with every call to the function candidateSet. Each such record stores the candidate set C y;k computed by the function, the target number y, the length l y of y, the parameter k, and the corresponding Z array for y. In order to achieve this, we change the candidateSet function in Fig. 3 to store the candidate set in the cache, before returning it.
15:
C t;k funkySort(z, C t;k ) 16: append(cache, ðt; l t ; k; C t;k ; ZÞÞ 17: return C t;k A new function candidateSetCached (Fig. 7) checks to see if a precomputed candidate set which can be used by this new algorithm, already exists.
Note that t start is the index in the original string y where the suffix t starts. The running time of the candidateSetCached function is Oðl Á cache:lengthÞ, which is the worst-case running time for executing lines 3 and 4. The candidateSetSuffix function given in Fig. 8 provides the algorithm for creating the new candidate set C t;k from a cached candidate set C y;k .
Since creating the candidate set for y involves scanning all of y to find the zeros, we can at the same time maintain an array which accumulates the number of zeros encountered so far during the scan. This array is the Z array which was created in the function candidateSet (lines 4 and 7). We can index into this array using the position which suffix t starts in y and thus get the number of zeros in constant time. For example, for y ¼ 01101010 and t ¼ 1010 given in terms of t start which is the start position of t in y, we can scan y from left to right and create the array Z ¼ ½1; 1; 1; 2; 2; 3; 3; 4. This arrays gives the number zeros in every suffix of y. Thus, zðtÞ ¼ zðyÞ À Z½t start À 1. In this case t start ¼ 4, and so
In addition, the mask (Fig. 8, lines 7 and 13 ) is used as a means of setting the first x bits of each original candidate set element to zero, which is the equivalent in a sense of taking the suffix of the corresponding binary string. For example, if the candidate set element is 18, with binary representation 10010, and we want to take the suffix starting at index 2, then the mask ¼ 7 (00111 in binary). Thus, by bitwise ANDing the mask and the element, we get 010 ¼ 2. Note that the masking does not simply set the higher order bits to zero but it truncates the number, i.e., the length actually decreases. This is important because we seek to derive from the candidate set of 10010 the candidate set of 010 and not the set for 00010. The latter is impossible to derive in the way described in this section since C 00010;2 is a superset of C 10010;2 . The "for" loop on line 12 dominates the running time of the above algorithm. Hence, the algorithm, in the worst case, runs in Âð2 zðtÞ Þ, which is optimal. However, we can do better by using a different representation for the candidate set of the suffix t. Since the elements of C t;k are contiguous elements of C y;k starting at position 0, then the candidate set of t can be given as a range of values. This is achieved just by maintaining a pointer to the position q À 1 in the candidate array of y marking the last element of C t;k . Thus, only two numbers mask, and q ¼ 2 zðtÞ , both of which can be computed in constant time, are needed to capture the candidate set of any suffix of target y. To create the mask, we use l t (as seen on line 5) which was computed from the input integer t start on line 3. Obtaining q is easy since we have already computed zðtÞ on line 4. Thus, the first and last elements of the candidate set for the suffix can be given as C y;k ½0 & mask and C y;k ½q À 1 & mask, respectively. This approach avoids the expensive "for" loop on line 12 and makes the algorithm run in Âð1Þ.
It is preferable to use the candidateSetSuffix Algorithm in one particular situation: to find the candidate set for the suffix of y whenever we already have the candidate set for y. Consider the following examples: For l ¼ 4, we want to calculate C 1010;7 and C 010;3 . C 1010;7 ¼ ; since
In the case of C 010;3 , we have 3 ! zðtÞ ¼ 2 > 0 and 2 zðtÞ ¼ 4 > k ¼ 3 so and thus C 010;3 ¼ f2; 3; 6; 7g. If we decide to use the faster constant running time approach, the result will be given as mask ¼ 0111 and q ¼ 2 2 ¼ 4 and hence the first element in C 010;3 is 4 A 1010;2 ½0 & 0111
Assume that we are auditing a variety of databases, each with a particular l value (for the example in this paper, l ¼ 4). Within the forensic analyzer, we could precompute a summary set for l max , which is the maximum of the l values that were specified for the databases that were being audited. During forensic analysis of a specific database corruption, given the resulting target string and the l value for this particular database (with l l max ), this algorithm could calculate in constant time the candidate set, which consists of all the possible corrupted granules that could have yielded that target number for that value of l.
IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
Elsewhere, we have introduced the Monochromatic, the RGB, and Polychromatic Algorithms [7] . All algorithms employ the same approach of tamper detection and forensic analysis by hashing transaction data and periodically validating the resulting hash chains. The main differences between the algorithms lie in the number of hash chains used and their structure. The simplest is the Monochromatic Algorithm, which sequentially hashes all data to create a hash chain that incrementally grows over the data of the entire database. The cumulative nature of this chain has two consequences. First, it limits the detection of corruption to a single event since periodic validations will yield a sequence of "success" results followed by a sequence of "failure" results. The interface in the transition between these two sequences marks the site of the first (oldest) corruption. Second, the cumulative nature of the chain enables a binary search on the sequence of "successes" and "failures" to locate the transition very quickly.
The RGB Algorithm augments the Monochromatic Algorithm by periodically superimposing (noncumulative) partial hash chains over the entire database. The name of the algorithm is derived from the color coding of the different partial hash chains. In this case, the cumulative chain can be used to perform binary search to quickly locate the oldest corruption and then switch to using the "colored" partial chains to explore the rest (more recent part) of the database. This algorithm can detect up to two corruption events.
The Polychromatic Algorithm retains the main Red, Green, and Blue partial chains of RGB and introduces more Red and Blue chains to create groups of chains similar to a tile. This has the advantage that it can arbitrarily shrink the spatial detection resolution by introducing a logarithmic number of hash chains as opposed to a linear number needed in RGB. The Polychromatic Algorithm, as with the RGB Algorithm, can only detect only up to two corruption events but could potentially be modified to handle multiple corruptions.
The Tiled Bitmap Algorithm introduced here can be thought of as a refinement/replacement of the Polychromatic Algorithm. The new algorithm can use the cumulative chain of the Monochromatic Algorithm (not elaborated on here). It extends the idea of the RGB Algorithm of using partial chains, and it refines the groups of hash chains of the Polychromatic Algorithm.
The advantage of the Tiled Bitmap Algorithm is that it lays down a regular pattern (a "tile") of such chains over contiguous segments of the database. What is more, it inherits all the advantages of the Polychromatic Algorithm: the chains in the tile form a bitmap which can be used for easy identification of the corruption region, and a logarithmic number of chains can be used to reduce R s .
The other advantage of the Tiled Bitmap Algorithm is that it can detect multiple corruption events (up to D of them, i.e., all granules were corrupted) something that the Monochromatic, RGB, and Polychromatic Algorithms cannot. On the other hand it suffers from false positives while the previous three algorithms do not. (More information on the rate of false positives of the Tiled Bitmap Algorithm can be found elsewhere [8] .) Table 3 shows the running time for three of the forensic analysis algorithms (the Polychromatic Algorithm is omitted because it is replaced by the Tiled Bitmap Algorithm). We assume that the spatial detection resolution R s is equal to 1 for simplicity. Observe that the algorithms become progressively slower because of the increased number of chains maintained and used during forensic analysis. The Monochromatic Algorithm, while being the fastest algorithm, suffers from the fact that only the first corruption event can be detected. As noted, the Tiled Bitmap Algorithm can be slightly optimized by retaining the cumulative chain of the Monochromatic in order to locate the first corrupted tile by performing binary search, although this refinement does not affect its asymptotic running time.
Recall that all algorithms rely on an external notarization service in order to validate the audit log. However, each such contact costs real money. Hence, we quantify the cost of the algorithms as the number of contacts with the notarization service during a specific duration of the normal operation of the system, i.e., whenever a part of the database is notarized or validated. The units of the cost are, therefore, number of notarizations plus number of validations. We chose to deal with only notarizations and validations occurring before corruption or forensic analysis, because otherwise the cost would be dependent on the number of corruptions. This would render the comparison unfair since the Monochromatic and RGB Algorithms can only detect a limited number of corruptions. More information on the mathematical formulation of the cost can be found elsewhere [8] . It is desirable to minimize this cost for each algorithm while trying to extract as much information as possible. Table 4 shows the cost for each of the forensic algorithms assuming a spatial detection resolution of one hour (R s ¼ 1) and a single corruption event. In this case, we observe the opposite trend compared to the one observed for the running times of the algorithms. For a sufficiently large validation interval I V , the Tiled Bitmap Algorithm has the smallest cost. This is because the ratio ð1 þ lg I V Þ=I V becomes less than one.
This quantification of cost also reflects the space complexity of the forensic algorithms since each of the contacts with the external notarization service corresponds to a hash value (of chains) which must be initially computed (and recomputed for comparison during validation) and maintained within the system. None of algorithms in Table 4 require extra space over the collection of hash values themselves.
A 1250-line C code implementation is available at http:// www.cs.arizona.edu/projects/tau/tbdb/. The code implements several forensic analysis algorithms, including the candidateSet and candidateSetSuffix construction algorithms, the Tiled Bitmap Algorithm, and the Monochromatic Algorithm. This C code implementation uses the more efficient pass-by-reference for arrays and strings compared to the pseudocode given in Section 6. All algorithms were tested extensively and their theoretical costs were experimentally validated. Appendix F, which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library at http://doi.ieeecom putersociety.org/10.1109/TKDE.2009.121, provides proofs of correctness for all functions introduced in this paper. We also have developed several graphical user interfaces which include a convenient visual representation of the spatial and temporal extent(s) of detected corruption(s). Fig. 9 shows the results of the experimental cost validation for the Monochromatic and Tiled Bitmap Algorithms (the RGB Algorithm has not been implemented). The experiments used the following setup: D ¼ 1 to 256, R s ¼ 1, and I V ¼ 8. Rather than using the cost formulas in order notation (as given in Table 4 ) to create the graphs, we used more involved (and more accurate) cost functions derived for each algorithm. Note that the cost plot shows both the predicted forensic cost (denoted by "(P)" in the plot legend) and actual cost values (denoted by "(A)" in the plot legend). The actual cost values were computed by inserting appropriate counters in the C code implementation for the Monochromatic and Tiled Bitmap algorithms. The different types of symbols on the curves were added for clarity and correspond to a subset of the actual data points. As can be seen in Fig. 9 , the predicted and actual cost for the two algorithms are essentially identical. A more detail explanation of the derived costs, and experimental comparisons between algorithms can be found elsewhere [8] .
PREVIOUS WORK
There has been a great deal of work on records management, and indeed, an entire industry has arisen to provide solutions for these needs, motivated recently by SarbanesOxley [13] and other laws requiring compliant record storage. In this context, a "record" is a version of a document. These systems utilize magnetic disks (as well as tape and optical drives) to provide WORM storage of compliant records. We wish to extend the concept of Computer forensics is now an active field, with more than 50 books published in the last 10 years. However, these books are generally about preparing admissible evidence for a court case, through discovery, duplication, and preservation of digital evidence. There are few computer tools for these tasks, in part due to the heterogeneity of the data. One substantive example of how computer tools can be used for forensic analysis is Mena's book [6] .
Goodrich et al. introduce new techniques for using mainmemory indexing structures for data forensics [3] . They encode authentication information in the way a data structure is organized (not in the stored values) so that alterations can be detected. Their techniques are based on a new reduced-randomness construction for nonadaptive combinatorial group testing, using message authentication codes (MAC) built using cryptographically strong, one-way hash functions. In the database context, we have introduced in previous papers the approach of using cryptographic hash functions to detect database tampering [10] and of introducing additional hash chains to improve forensic analysis [7] . To the best of our knowledge, there are no other competing forensic analysis algorithms for highperformance databases.
Strachey has considered table lookup to increase the efficiency of bitwise operations [11] . He provides a logarithmic time/logarithmic space algorithm for reversing the bits in a word. Our second algorithm requires only constant time, but the table must be of exponential space.
Enumerating all solutions (preimages) is a key step in formal verification. Sheng and coworkers have developed efficient preimage computation algorithms [4] , [9] . These algorithms are similar to the ones introduced in this paper in that they all enumerate all possible solutions. The formal verification algorithms differ in that they are computing preimages of a state transition network, rather than of bitwise AND functions, as in our paper.
SUMMARY
Forensic analysis commences when a crime has been detected, in this case the tampering of a database. Such analysis endeavors to ascertain when the tampering occurred, and what data were altered.
Elsewhere, we proposed several forensic analysis algorithms [7] . The present paper expands upon that work by presenting the Tiled Bitmap Algorithm, which is cheaper and more powerful than prior algorithms. This algorithm employs a logarithmic number of hash chains within each tile to narrow down the when and what.
Checking the hash chain values produces a binary number; it is the task of the algorithm to compute the preimage of bitwise AND functions of that number. This produces a candidate set which identifies all the potentially corrupted granules. We showed that the running time of the algorithm is linear in the length of time the database has been in existence and linear in the size of the computed candidate set. We also note that previous algorithms do not handle multiple corruption events well, whereas the Tiled Bitmap Algorithm can independently analyze corruption events occurring both in different tiles and multiple corruption events occurring within a single tile. However, the Tiled Bitmap Algorithm suffers from false positive results while prior algorithms (Monochromatic, RGB, and Polychromatic) do not.
In the later parts of the paper, we analyzed completely the behavior of the candidate sets and developed an optimal algorithm to produce these candidate sets. We then introduced a constant-time algorithm which is preferable in the case when the target binary number is a suffix of another binary number for which a candidate set already exists. Finally, we compared prior forensic algorithms with the Tiled Bitmap Algorithm, providing a thorough space and time complexity analysis. We discussed the implementation of the algorithms and experimentally validated their cost. The Tiled Bitmap Algorithm uses additional chains (which incur a logarithmic runtime factor) to detect multiple corruption events, while requiring fewer requests of an external notarization server.
The ultimate goal is an algorithm that retains the logarithmic performance (of the additional chains) of the Tiled Bitmap Algorithm while further simplifying the analysis within a tile, furthering narrowing the bounds on when the tampering occurred, and providing additional forensic information, such as the direction of the tampering, i.e., whether the information was backdated or postdated. . For more information on this or any other computing topic, please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
